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L’âme est un instrument sur lequel on peut faire entendre indéfiniment 
des airs nouveaux, mais qui redit de lui-même et chante toujours en 
sourdine et sans confusion ceux qu’il a joués autrefois. C’est un cahier 
des feuilles phonographiques.
Joseph Delboeuf, Le sommeil et les rêves (1885)
To those who are still claiming that telecommunications are the latest 
form of colonization, I would like to suggest that the colonizers are 
always the first victims of the colonizing technology, usually because 
they remain resolutely unaware of the psychological impact of the tech-
nology they are using to colonize.
 Derrick de Kerckhove, The Skin of Culture (1995)
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This essay develops the idea of the dubject as a model of remediateda  subjectiv-
ity. It will discuss some theoretical and institutional contexts of the dubject, 
and then will consider digital manifestations of the dubject with reference to 
how popular digital applications interpellate the user (see Althusser 1971)—that 
is, how they impose specific ideological and institutional conditions and lim-
itations on applications and on users’ possibilities for self-representation. This 
work is an attempt to think digital identity and agency in the context of postcol-
oniality, as a complement to the more prevalent approach to mediated identity 
in terms of postmodernity. This work thus builds my larger research project of 
applying postcolonialist critique to popular culture, particularly that of Canada’s 
majority white settler society.
At the outset, I want to note the resonance of the keyword of this collec-
tion to which an early version of this chapter contributed: the word nexus. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines “nexus” as the state of being connected or 
linked, with related meanings as network, as node, and as link. A word with 
such closely related but wide-reaching structural and relational meanings has 
found widespread uses in popular culture, some of which are noteworthy here. 
Nexus is the brand name for a line of Cisco data systems; the brand name for a 
Canada-U.S. border crossing program; and the brand name for a line of Google 
mobile devices that run the Android operating system. This last example of 
Nexus as brand is a science-fiction joke: in the canonical film Blade Runner, 
“Nexus 6” is the brand name of a line of corporate-manufactured androids, sev-
eral of whom are the plot’s antagonists. “Nexus 6. [...] Incept date 2016. Combat 
model. Optimum self-sufficiency. [...] The standard item for military clubs in the 
outer colonies. They were designed to copy human beings in every way except 
their emotions” (1982). These androids, or replicants, are distinguishable from 
humans through biometric indicators of empathy only detectable by a special-
ized test—they are at once doppelgängers and simulacra, superficially identical to 
humans, defined by their inability to relate.
These connotations—of science-fiction impostors, mobile technology, and 
border crossing; of doubles, devices, and jurisdictions—converge, a nexus unto 
themselves, in the specific site of encounter between customs official and travel-
ler. The “impostor” or doppelgänger dimension here involves the popular sense 
a “Remediation” is Bolter and Grusin’s (1999) term for the double movement whereby 
new and old media each strive for both self-effacing immediacy and “hypermediation,” 
a self-reflexive signalling of mediation.
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of Canadians as virtually indistinguishable from Americans, a sense that is both 
widespread and conducive to subversive expressions of national difference (see 
McCutcheon, 2009a). In a 2006 case concerning a U.S. customs office’s search 
of a traveller’s digital devices, U.S. district court judge Dean Pregeson issued a 
ruling that describes electronic storage devices (in McLuhanesque terms) as “an 
extension of our own memory . . . capable of storing our thoughts” (2006). This 
decision provided the impetus for the “border search exception,” an expansion 
of U.S. customs officers’ powers that was conferred in 2008, and that gave offi-
cers carte blanche authority to search the digital devices of any and every trav-
eller entering the U.S.A., without warrant, in the name of national security. A 
real-world policy with dystopian implications, the border search exception has 
just been overturned; in March 2013, a U.S. federal appeals court ruled against 
the exception, writing that “a person’s digital life ought not be hijacked simply by 
crossing a border” (quoted in Kravets, 2013). A legal expert commentator notes 
how the ruling pivots on “the idea that you can hold your entire life in your 
laptop” (Price quoted in Kravets, 2013).
Extending minds, storing memories, holding lives in laptops: comments like 
these conjure the lived experience of subjectivity under neoliberal global cap-
italism as a redistribution of identity, a cathexis of prostheses, a certain kind of 
cyborg subjectivity between performance and recording, an experience that will 
be explored here under the name of the dubject. In prior articles (2009a, 2011, 
2012, 2014), I have begun to formulate a theory of the dubject, where I posit it as
a self committed to its own recording; a subject translated from the site 
of the individual body to the mediated spaces of representation; a self 
dubbed and doubled—a doppelgänger self whose “live,” corporeal pres-
ence becomes radically supplemented . . . by its different and distributed 
embodiments in recordings and representations. . . . In some cases, the 
trajectory of this displacement becomes a strategy of survival, a tactical 
retreat: from the real into simulation, from the flesh into the word. 
(2012: 236–37)
So the dubject is an attempt to name the kind of experience George Siemens 
(2013) has described as “seeing bits and pieces of yourself all over the Internet”; 
however, this dubject theory also encompasses other media. My initial work on 
this has situated the dubject not only in its postmodern contexts but also in post-
colonial contexts. These contexts include the “black electronic” (Davis, 2004) 
practices of dub and other sonic fictions (Eshun, 1998), and, more specifically, 
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contexts of cultural and media imperialism, which position the dubject as a 
victim or fugitive, echoing Marshall McLuhan’s ideas of electronic subjectivity 
as colonized victimhood: “The violence that all electric media inflict on their 
users is that they are instantly invaded and deprived of their physical bodies and 
are merged in a network of extensions of their own nervous systems” (1996: 82). 
My initial work has identified Canadian popular culture as an illustrative site for 
theorizing the dubject, with reference to its fictional dramatizations in works 
like David Cronenberg’s Videodrome, its theoretical iterations in writings by 
McLuhan, and—more strangely, perhaps, but more to the point—its historical 
manifestations by cultural practitioners such as Glenn Gould. In Cronenberg’s 
Videodrome, the character Brian O’Blivion—a parody of McLuhan—exists only, 
and uncannily, on television, like Max Headroom. Gould famously forsook live 
performance for the recording studio; his recording of Bach now approaches 
interstellar space aboard Voyager 2.1 On the basis of these contexts and practi-
ces, I have argued that “articulating Canada’s political economy of comprom-
ised sovereignty and its history of colonization by various cultural and media 
empires, the incarnations and iterations of dubjectivity position the individual 
citizen as a commodity produced by competing intellectual property claims, 
the consumer of media as what media themselves consume, the organic self 
reorganized and reproduced by its technological others” (2011: 261).
But I have realized that positing the dubject as a victim of or fugitive from 
cultural and media imperialism means misrepresenting Canadian colonialism, by 
positioning white settler majority persons and productions among the colonized, 
when they more accurately represent the colonizer, in the political economy of 
Canada, as an immigration-based resource extraction colony, established through 
a systemic segregation and dispossession of Canada’s First Nations that provided 
the model for South African apartheid. Canadian popular culture is dominated by 
the neo-imperialism of mainly U.S.-imported cultural productions and technolo-
gies, but Canadian political economy is characterized by its own neo-imperial 
projects of capital (see Kellogg, 2013). So the Canadian nation-state does provide 
an exemplary postcolonial context for theorizing the dubject—but this is because 
Canada represents both a target of cultural and media imperialism and a rapa-
cious agent of neo-imperialist capital. In the context of media imperialism, the 
immigrant and largely European-derived settler population of Canada occupies 
the position of the colonized with respect to the neo-imperial cultural industries 
of the U.S.A. and the U.K. But in the context of Canada’s historical formation 
as an invading colonial arm of European state-based imperialism, a formation 
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that continues to structure its relationship to Canada’s indigenous peoples 
in a manner analogous to apartheid, we must of course recognize the massive 
inequality that remains between the relatively privileged population colonized by 
media imperialism and the hugely disadvantaged population colonized by settler-
invader imperialism.
As I have specified elsewhere (2012), while the focus on Canadian sites and 
practices of cultural production, scholarship, and social reproduction first gave 
rise to theorizing the dubject, that focus does not imply that only Canadian sites 
and practices can or should be theorized as sites and practices of the dubject; 
rather, these sites and practices “signal some potentially wider—and weirder—
implications for everyday life in the overdeveloped, technologically overdriven, 
and hypermediated Western world today” (2012: 238). Accordingly, what follows 
will sustain a focus on Canadian sites and practices, but will also broaden in 
scope to consider related sites and practices across the Anglophone overdevel-
oped world. After all, the neo-imperial incursions, annexations, and exploita-
tions of capitalism and its cultural industries today—including the companies 
and services discussed here—are not restricted to any specific nation-states, but 
rather take (and take for granted) the whole world as their market, their labora-
tory, and their labour pool.
If the dubject represents the colonized under media imperialism, then, it 
also represents the colonizer, not only in Canada’s postcolonial popular cul-
ture, but also in broader theoretical and institutional contexts of digital media 
as a neoliberal, private-public sphere that reproduces and naturalizes dominant 
forms of subjectivity—those of “imperialist white supremacist capitalist patri-
archy” (hooks, 2000: 46). These reproductions and naturalizations of dominant 
identity formation become clear according to how, and by whom, and for whom 
digital identity and agency have been theorized.
If the remediation and redistribution of the self suggest a kind of survival, 
then to whom, specifically, is this kind of survival available? The examples I have 
discussed in prior work on the dubject illustrate the predominance of imperial-
ist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchal normativity and thus a rather privil-
eged demographic (notwithstanding the diverse and sometimes countercultural 
politics of their productions): Cronenberg’s O’Blivion, and his real-world source, 
McLuhan; the eccentric virtuoso Gould, another icon of mainstream Canadian 
culture; and examples in Canadian fiction by white male writers William 
Gibson, Cory Doctorow, Peter Watts, and Tony Burgess. So examples of the 
dubject I have found thus far constitute a parade of white, male, and relatively 
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affluent exemplars. In contrast, a great deal of the scholarship and theory on 
which my theorization of the dubject draws has been produced by women and 
feminist scholars (and not specifically Canadian ones, either). As an attempt to 
theorize the doubling and spacing of subjectivity in media forms, as well as their 
possibilities for supplementing the somatically centred liberal-humanist subject 
with an uncanny “second life,” the dubject relates to influential studies of digital 
identity, such as Turkle’s theory of the “second self” (1995), Haraway’s cyborg as 
a model of networked agency and resistance (1991), and N. Katherine Hayles’s 
posthumanism (1999), as well as to more recent work such as Angela Thomas’s 
work on virtual self-authorship (2007) and Emily Apter’s theory of the avatar 
as a coordinator of conflicted and competing psychic drives (2008). While the 
dubject has commonalities with and conceptual debts to these prior theories of 
digital identity and “the subject in technics,” it differs more broadly from them 
in emphasizing not the postmodern conditions or poststructuralist models of 
late capitalist subjectivity (which it does recognize and build on), but, instead, 
its postcolonial contexts. To Anna Poletti and Julie Rak’s recent call for combin-
ing auto/biography studies and new media studies to examine digital identity 
(2014), I would add that a postcolonialist lens can help make intersectional sense 
of digital identity practices. In this light, the assemblage theory of Jasbir Puar 
becomes useful for historicizing the “epistemic violence” of hegemonic sub-
ject formations, and for deterritorializing identity as provisional agency, as “an 
encounter, an event, an accident.”
Apter and Haraway are worth some discussion here, since my theory of 
the remediated, doubled, and spaced subject is informed by subject theory: 
the corpus of poststructuralist theories of the subject, and, more specifically, 
theories of what Apter calls “the subject in technics” (2008). Poststructuralism 
develops and destabilizes the subject’s grounding in psychoanalysis and phenom-
enology, theorizing the subject not as primary and self-determining but as “sec-
ondary, constructed . . . volatile, standing in its own shadow, and self-divided” 
(Hawthorn, 1992: 181). What Apter calls the “subject in technics,” then, routes 
this theory through postmodern media theory. Avital Ronnell, for instance, 
argues that telephony reconfigures the modern liberal subject in more post-
structuralist terms: “the call transfers you to the Other. . . . Telephonics imposes 
the recognition of a certain irreducible precedence of the Other with respect to 
the self” (1991: 82). The work of Friedrich Kittler (1986/1999) exemplifies “subject 
in technics” theory: he historicizes the subject as a “discourse network” struc-
tured by media technologies—which Kittler shows historically to be products 
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of warfare. For Kittler, modern subjectivity is a kind of simulation program, 
both sustained and subverted by recording media, and increasingly vestigial to a 
nascent, globalizing regime of cybernetic, artificial intelligence: “After the stor-
age capacities for optics, acoustics, and writing had been separated, mechan-
ized, and extensively utilized, the central nervous system was resurrected, but 
as a Golem made of Golems” (170). Building on work like Kittler’s, Apter then 
develops “subject in technics” theory by reading the digital self-imaging practice 
of creating an “avatar” as a remediated coordinator of the drives that comprise 
the subject—the avatar as a driver of the drives.
An influential source for the subject in technics is Haraway’s theory of the 
cyborg: a model of radically remediated and trenchantly feminist identity and 
agency under globalized capitalism. Unfortunately, the canonical status of 
Haraway’s cyborg in critical theory has subjected it to reductive misreadings, like 
that of the Cyborgology blog editors, two Maryland doctoral students, Nathan 
Jurgenson and P. J. Rey, who have leveraged theory such as Haraway’s and tools 
such as social media and print periodicals to advance their own model of digital 
subjectivity, which might be called the Augmented Reality argument. In a 2012 
refereed article, Cyborgology co-editor Jurgenson claims that “the Facebook user 
is the paradigmatic example of the Harawaysian ‘cyborg’” (2012b: 86). Such a 
claim seriously misunderstands Haraway’s cyborg, which makes critical use of 
technologies and networks to mount a queer, feminist resistance to imperial-
ist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy—not a blithe complicity with it, as 
implied by Jurgenson’s reference to the billion-dollar advertising and surveil-
lance business that is Facebook.
Jurgenson and Rey appropriate the term “augmented reality” (first coined 
around 1990) to critique what they see as a pervasive but flawed premise in writ-
ing and research on the digital mediascape, a premise they call “digital dual-
ism”: a polarized representation of digital activity that pits “real life” against the 
internet (and tends to champion the former over the latter). Citing examples in 
recent work like Nicholas Carr’s The Shallows (2010) and Sherry Turkle’s Alone 
Together (2012), the Cyborgology editors are far from alone in criticizing the 
reductionism of arguments that new media, as new media, are rotting brains, 
destroying society, or hindering youth literacy. A shrewd and short riposte to 
such arguments is made by Kathleen Fitzpatrick: “media theorists, confronted 
with a narrative about the deleterious effects of new modes of communication, 
have long pointed to Plato . . . new technologies are perennially imagined to 
be not simply the enemy of established systems but in fact a direct threat to 
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the essence of what it is to be human. For this reason, declarations of cultural 
decline always bear complexly submerged ideological motivations” (2012: 42).
In contrast to Fitzpatrick’s view of the longue durée, the Cyborgology editors 
ground their argument much more specifically, both in more narrowly socio-
logical theory and in more contemporary, twenty-first-century social media and 
mobile devices. Jurgenson writes:
Our reality is both technological and organic, both digital and physical, 
all at once. We are not crossing in and out of separate digital and 
physical realities, a la The Matrix, but instead live in one reality, one 
that is augmented by atoms and bits. And our selves are not separated 
across these two spheres as some dualistic “first” and “second” self, but 
is instead an augmented self. A Haraway-like cyborg self comprised of a 
physical body as well as our digital Profile, acting in constant dialogue. 
(2011: emphases added)
Interrogating the reductive division of digital and unmediated experience has 
critical value, but the augmented reality argument is both problematic in its 
premises and symptomatic of the aforementioned reproduction of the nor-
mative subjectivity of imperialist capitalist patriarchy.2 First, aside from its 
misprisions of Haraway, this argument nowhere addresses psychoanalytic or 
poststructuralist subject theory, which is directly relevant to it. Second, the 
argument often reads like a generation-bound manifesto, too quick to dismiss 
the nuances of influential authorities’ insights on the subject. Most important, 
this argument ignores the neoliberal political economy of the read-write web as 
a communications platform produced and structured by neo-imperial capital to 
facilitate and accelerate profit maximization, market creation, and service priva-
tization, as well as state surveillance for the governments that now act mostly as 
capitalism’s hired goons (Annesley, 2001; Hedges, 2012; Schneier, 2013; van Veen, 
2011). The augmented reality argument’s neglect of digital political economy 
makes a claim like “Facebook is real life” (Jurgenson, 2012a) problematic, even 
disturbing, notwithstanding its use for challenging the ideological opposition 
between human and technology.
Cyborgology appears to be informed by Marc Prensky’s model of “digital 
natives” versus “digital immigrants”: formulated in 2001, Prensky’s model distin-
guishes between older Internet users who have to learn the Internet like a second 
language and younger users, those who became teenagers after 2000, who are 
in effect “born digital” and speak fluent Internet. One Cyborgology article cites 
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Prensky, whose influence is also seen in Cyborgology’s “About” blurb: “We live in 
a cyborg society. Technology has infiltrated the most fundamental aspects of our 
lives: social organization, the body, even our self-concepts. This blog chronicles 
our new, augmented reality.” The undefined but vaguely generation-bound “we,” 
together with the blurb’s focus on the “new,” suggest Prensky’s model as a premise 
for the augmented reality argument.
Prensky’s “natives versus immigrants” model has itself been extensively cri-
tiqued, though not enough from postcolonial perspectives (see Bayne and Ross). 
One brilliant exception is Wayne Barry, who writes that “The whole lexicon 
of ‘digital native’, ‘digital immigrant’, ‘digital savage’, ‘technological migrant’, 
‘digital colonist’, and ‘digital refugee’ is imperialistic in nature and racist by 
inclination.”3 Prensky’s model privileges digital natives over immigrants, repro-
duces nationalist discourses of atavistic xenophobia, and appropriates the term 
“native” to describe Internet users who are predominantly not natives but set-
tlers and their descendants, and who enjoy widespread broadband access. In 
contrast, approximately half of all First Nations households and schools have 
Internet access (Chiefs Assembly on Education 2012), and only 17 percent of First 
Nations communities have broadband (Canadian Council on Learning 2010).
An analysis of “Canada’s digital divide” made in 2001 remains all too relevant: 
“Geographic or social isolation, high costs, and lack of infrastructure contribute 
to a ‘digital divide’ between First Nations peoples and other Canadians. Designed 
for profitable urban markets, digital networks and content that might address 
Native needs for education and information have not yet been fully extended to 
remote communities” (Bredin, 2001: 191). For Canada’s native communities, the 
extreme poverty sustained by systemic federal underfunding (Fontaine, 2013) 
keeps more basic health and environmental needs more pressing: problems like 
cold, mould, overcrowding, and sewage fume exposure are not the exception 
but the norm in reservation schools—as are empty library shelves (Opikokew, 
2013). These facts of postcolonial Canada make the “digital natives and immi-
grants” model as galling as the recent “upsettler” reaction to #IdleNoMore is 
plainly racist. The glaring omission of political economic critique in the aug-
mented reality argument, in this context, becomes legible as a symptom of its 
basis in imperialist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchal subjectivity. In step 
with what Derrida calls “white mythology” (1974: 5), the augmented reality argu-
ment universalizes and naturalizes this specific, privileged subjectivity as the 
ideological norm—the “average” user—not only in its proponents’ own iden-
tity formations (white, male, and otherwise “WEIRD” in Henrich et al.’s 2009 
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formulation)b but also in its rhetoric, in the consistent and unexamined use of 
the plural first-person, the presumed, undefined, collective “we” who live real 
life online.
Hayles has satirized precisely this rhetoric in How We Became Posthuman 
(1999); explaining her book’s title, Hayles writes: “‘We,’ like ‘became,’ is meant 
ironically, positioning itself in opposition to the techno-ecstasies found in vari-
ous magazines, such as Mondo 2000, which customarily speak of the transform-
ation into the posthuman as if it were a universal human condition when in 
fact it affects only a small fraction of the world’s population” (6). This “we” that 
Hayles explicates recurs in the rhetoric of numerous digital commentators, the 
majority of whom represent a very “small fraction” of the population indeed. 
Hence the question: For whom does the dubject offer its doublings and spacings 
of remediated selfhood?
We get a clearer sense of the dominant identity politics of the dubject by 
considering what I might call “discourses on dubjection”: statements and specu-
lations on the transformation of the self through media, many of which are 
characterized as fantasies of “uploading consciousness” from human bodies to 
machines. The fantasy of “uploaded consciousness” recurs among a particular 
class of thinkers, who represent this fantasy according to two common and 
conjoined rhetorical moves: first, in the name of an ostensibly universal but 
ideologically specific collective, “we”—the species on whose behalf the imperial-
ist white capitalist patriarchal subject entitles himself to speak—who will have 
become posthuman; and second, as an act or movement of disembodiment, 
a separation of digital from physical, mind from body, with all the violence 
of gender- and class-coded subordination it suggests. Recall, for instance, in 
William Gibson’s novel Neuromancer (1984), the starkly gender-coded contrast 
between the disembodied, cerebral transcendence of cyberspace and the “rot-
ting darkness” of “meat” existence. As Amanda Fernbach writes of Neuromancer 
in 2000: “Like the fantasies played out in contemporary discourses about the 
internet and virtual reality, Gibson’s cyberspace allows for the disavowal of 
bodily differences in a fantasy that privileges the white male body. . . . The notion 
b “WEIRD” is Henrich et al.’s acronym for Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, 
and Democratic, which of course most of the world isn’t; the WEIRD thesis challenges 
the global representativeness of claims for “human” psychology and society that many 
disciplines generalize on the basis of sampling Western, Anglophone postsecondary 
students.
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that online personas transcend social and cultural hierarchies remains a uto-
pian myth” (Fernbach, 2000: n.p.) Fernbach’s reflections still resonate today. The 
“democratizing rhetoric” that Fernbach notes includes the ideological language 
of universal inclusivity—ideological in its arrogation of species representative-
ness to a tiny, privileged fraction of the citizenry—and the similarly ideological 
imagery of dubjectivity’s remediated embodiments in terms of disembodiment, 
the transcendence of corporeality.
McLuhan’s media theory exemplifies these rhetorical moves. In 1971, 
McLuhan alludes to both television and incipient computing in his statement 
that “what is very little understood about the electronic age is that it angelizes 
man, disembodies him. Turns him into software” (1996: 79). The gender cat-
egory “man” here, together with the epochal imagery of the “electronic age,” 
serves to universalize the experience of remediation. McLuhan later elaborates 
on this idea of disembodied remediation in a 1978 article: “when you are ‘on 
the telephone’ or ‘on the air,’ you do not have a physical body. In these media, 
the sender is sent and is instantaneously present everywhere. The disembod-
ied user extends to all those who are recipients of electric information” (1996: 
80). Derrick de Kerckhove (McLuhan’s successor as the director of University of 
Toronto’s Centre for Culture and Technology) also uses this rhetoric to express 
ideas of doubling and spacing the self in telecommunications and virtual real-
ity. “In the simulation and extensions of our nervous systems,” he writes, “we 
personally figure as nodal entities, travelling back and forth on electric current 
patterns” (1995: 186).4 The author Douglas Coupland provides a sardonic version 
in his 2006 novel JPod: “Remember how, back in 1990, if you used a cellphone in 
public you looked like a total asshole? We’re all assholes now” (2006: 270, empha-
sis added). As seen in statements like these, the universalization and disembodi-
ment of digital identity couple in a consummation devoutly to be wished—by a 
very specifically gender- and class-bound tradition of thinkers. Disembodiment 
is the ideological fantasy that structures the estranged embodiments of the dub-
ject; universalization is the ideological fantasy that authorizes its restriction to 
privileged agents of imperialist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy.
We also see these rhetorical moves in read-write web services that invite 
users to generate content, and, in the process, solicit this arguable “self-com-
modification” —from a relatively privileged “target” demographic—as a relatively 
privileged and non-exploitative kind of commodification, as Andrew Feenberg 
discusses earlier in this volume (see also Hesmondhalgh, 2010). The commodifi-
cation of the self—the transformation of subject to dubject—is a valued object of 
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Terms Of Service (TOS) licensing because the users who generate content consti-
tute a conspicuously privileged demographic: “The social demographics of UGC 
platform visitors bespeak an average user who is highly educated, well connected 
and well paid . . . UCG users—whether active creators or passive spectators—form 
an attractive demographic to advertisers” (van Dijck 2009, 47).
In this context, for all the symptomatic articulations of hegemonic, col-
onizer privilege in his projections of “electronic man,” McLuhan, like Toronto 
poet Christopher Dewdney with his premillennial speculations on “transhu-
manism” (1998), can at least be credited with gesturing to the political economic 
implications of this transformation’s corporate structuring. While television 
is his new medium of choice, McLuhan writes of new media’s public-private 
convergence and conflict was very suggestive for the Internet, in his state-
ment that “we have leased our central nervous systems to various corporations” 
(1964/2003: 100). McLuhan tended to use “corporate” in its non-business sense 
as a synonym for “collective,” but a statement like this indicates a grasp of pol-
itical economy otherwise muted in (or absent from) his work. Dewdney, for his 
part, pays more attention to the business contexts of the Internet. He tempers 
his extrapolations from virtual reality to virtually unrecognizable futures—in 
which “the term ‘identity’ may not even apply” (1998: 191)—with projections of 
a growing role for corporations. “If consciousness should, ultimately, prove to 
be uploadable,” he writes, “corporations will hold patents on the software that 
will embrace our minds” (1998: 178). Pursuing the corporate copyright impli-
cations further, he speculates on the “possib[ility] for recipient individuals to 
acquire copyrighted living simulations of a portion of a gifted individual’s brain, 
as licensed by the manufacturer”—but asks whether “becoming, even partially, a 
corporate cognitive product may be an identity threshold that humans will not 
wish to cross” (1998: 179). From McLuhan’s perspective to those of social media 
TOS agreements, this threshold may be one that “we”—a specific, privileged class 
of subjects—have already crossed.
A theory of the dubject, as outlined here, might suggest that corporations 
already do hold such patents (and fight over them), and that the uploading of 
consciousness is not only what they trade on but what they actively structure, 
solicit, and stimulate—for profit-maximizing purposes, and also for meeting the 
surveillance demands of the state governments that under neoliberalism now 
serve more as clients and enablers of corporate interests than as stewards of 
public interest. If digitization is about replacing labour with capital, then what 
is the digitization of the self? Especially in private sites that only simulate public 
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space? The dubject’s digital redistributions of identity effectively disperse cit-
izens across domestic and alien jurisdictions: Canadians using U.S.-based ser-
vices such as Google, Facebook, Dropbox, and Twitter, for instance, store the 
content they upload to these services in U.S.-housed data centres, where they are 
vulnerable to Patriot Act search provisions. Enacting dubjection entails supply-
ing work and product (content) for corporate and state powers; dubjecting one’s 
self in the digital nexus, each click and keystroke generating data for unknown 
private interests to analyze, the user becomes a participant in his or her own 
oppression and exploitation—while also finding ways to leverage agency from 
these tools for opposition and praxis, as shown by Wikileaks and the organizing 
affordances of social media.
Between the back-end analytics and the front-end interface, the doubled 
and spaced digital self constitutes both colonizer and colonized according to 
how Internet services and platforms permit certain orders of discourse, produce 
certain kinds of subject positions. That is, the Internet interpellates the user, and 
then also dubjects the user, independently of the user’s agency or awareness, 
as an abstracted, analytic commodity, a self made of metadata—a self made, 
for the most part, unconsciously. If the user doubles and spaces him- or herself 
across the digital nexus, he or she can do so only according to specific and some-
times subtle premises and priorities of imperialist white-supremacist capitalist 
patriarchy.
Social media such as Facebook and Twitter interpellate a privileged sub-
ject, the liberal humanist-turned-consumerist subject of the neoliberal capital-
ist system that has innovated and popularized the read-write web (Smith and 
Watson, 82). A growing body of scholarship critiques the social media user as 
commodity (van Dijck, 2009; McNeill, 2014). In a complementary analysis of 
the encoding of neoliberal ideology and privilege into contemporary consumer 
technologies, Alice Marwick argues they solicit users’ participation as entrepre-
neurs, as marketers of the self as brand (see also Smith and Watson, 2014: 79), 
and in the process they entrench intersectional socioeconomic inequalities. (For 
instance, when’s the last time you checked the “Stocks” app on your iPhone? 
Right . . . I never have either.)
Recent articles by Rob Cover and Aimée Morrison analyze how Facebook 
hails and coaxes users to post and share—that is, how it interpellates users. Cover 
analyzes the creation and maintenance of a user’s profile: “the management of 
the profile . . . is an act of self-governance, which produces embodied selves and 
subjects through an interpellation that ‘hails’ one to choose the coordinates of 
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identityhood” (2014: 64). Cover also notes how Facebook constrains these coor-
dinates: “the profile-provided categories on social networking sites offer a notion 
of freedom to ‘choose,’ which is endemic to neoliberal thinking . . . yet they risk 
for some users the violence of a normative truth-regime, which excludes alter-
native [ways of] doing subjectivity otherwise” (65–66). “Unrecognizable selves,” 
as Cover observes, “demand explanation” (59). Similarly, Morrison describes the 
interpellations of Facebook as “coaxed affordances”: “Facebook’s status update 
feature makes use of designed affordances and constraints, as well as emerging 
cultural convention, in order to coax life narratives from its users” (2014: 119). 
Consequently, Facebook’s “coaxed affordances” render “some kinds of statements 
impossible” (123), and thanks to more recently introduced features, they tend 
now to identify the user’s digital profile with the user “in real life”; as Morrison 
observes, the recently introduced “Timeline” format “increasingly conflates . . . a 
user’s entire social media history . . . with that user’s entire life” (127).
Twitter lends itself to the kind of close reading Cover and Morrison give 
Facebook. On first visit, Twitter “welcomes” you, it invites you to “start a conver-
sation, explore your interests, and be in the know.” You are invited to sign up or 
sign in (and if you don’t unclick “remember me?” to stay signed in). If you botch 
the sign-in, you get this pop-up query: “We gotta check . . . are you human?” This 
might be interpellation’s most exemplary expression: the undefined but osten-
sibly corporate “we” —”we” who ask on behalf of Twitter—self-deprecatingly, 
colloquially, innocuously ask to “check” whether the user is “human.” Ironically, 
the “we” who asks is not human—it is a corporately directed and programmed 
subroutine—but this “we” still presumes, in the phrasing of its question, to coax 
a human response. On a user’s page, the “coaxing affordance” is a text-entry 
field showing a greyed-out invitation to “Compose new Tweet . . .” Compose: 
the exhortation is to write and to craft, to communicate economically. As I have 
tweeted elsewhere, the constraint of brevity imposed by the interface is a clue 
to Twitter’s neoliberal encoding: “Twitter’s textual economy normalizes for 
communication the neoliberal ideology that fiscal austerity is the only way to 
run a public service” (2009b). By this point, the implied subject of both the “we” 
and the “human” in Twitter’s “check” should be legible as the imperialist white-
supremacist capitalist patriarch of the overdeveloped world. So should the 
implied subjectivity of “real identity” that is increasingly demanded by digital 
service firms.
As Cover says, social media interpellate users doubly, according to competing 
demands: “the Enlightenment demand that one articulate oneself as a rational, 
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coherent, and intelligible subject and a decentered and fragmented subjectivity, 
which fulfills the demand that we express identity in fleeting ways through forms 
of consumption” under late capitalism (2014: 61). Social media doubly interpel-
late users—that is, it dubs and versions them (as the sites constantly version 
themselves [Morrison, 2014: 120]); social media hails users to become dubjects. 
Morrison further observes that while social sites interpellate users as content 
creators, the site affordances enable not authorship but a kind of algorithmic 
“auto-assemblage . . . the result of ongoing selection and appropriation of con-
tent across several modes brought together into a constellation for the purpose 
of self-representation” (Whitlock and Poletti quoted in Morrison, 2014: 113). In 
this context, processes of dubjection entail the “uploading of selves” (McNeill, 
2014: 160) not only as voluntary self-representations but also as involuntary sets 
of data and metadata, which we might call the technological id counterpart to 
the ego of the user-generated content.
Social media sites routinely demand “real identity” details of users to access 
and authenticate their accounts. This demand for “guarantors of authenticity” 
informs most sites’ interpellation strategies, and it relates “to the ideological for-
mations of global capitalism” (Smith and Watson, 2014: 76–77), as a naturaliza-
tion of “capitalist realism” (Fisher, 2009), of “white mythology” (Derrida, 1974), 
and of “the legal and capitalist structures that demand the fixity of the rights 
bearing subject” (Puar, 2011)—as well as a legitimization of ubiquitous digital 
surveillance. The growing corporate insistence that the user provide one’s “real” 
identity marks a dramatic reversal of the privacy and promise of the early open 
web. In the 1990s, the web garnered countless critical theorizations and popular 
celebrations for enabling a quintessentially postmodern playfulness and experi-
mentation with digital identity. Mark Poster’s “Cyberdemocracy” (1995) makes a 
representative statement: “The salient characteristic of Internet community is 
the diminution of prevailing hierarchies of race, class, age, status and especially 
gender” (1995). Contrast this utopian expression of the possibilities of postmod-
ern digital self-creation with the effects of the present Internet’s insistence on 
identification and verification: the horrific misogynist violence levelled against 
feminists like Anita Sarkeesian; the anguish and tragedy of online bullying and 
sexual harassment; the ugly unveiling of “upsettler” racism in reactions against 
#IdleNoMore; and an ever-tighter web of constant, ubiquitous surveillance, 
which digital security Bruce Schneier describes as a “surveillance state effective 
beyond Orwell’s wildest imaginings”—all made possible through users’ willing 
participation:
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Everything we do now involves computers, and computers produce data 
as a natural by-product. Everything is now being saved and correlated, 
and many big-data companies make money by building up intimate 
profiles of our lives from a variety of sources. . . . Maintaining privacy 
on the Internet is nearly impossible. . . . Governments are happy to use 
the data corporations collect—occasionally demanding that they collect 
more and save it longer—to spy on us. And corporations are happy to 
buy data from governments. (Schneier, 2013)
Cognizant of the critiques of approaches to the Internet as a utopian space 
for postmodern self-fashioning—such as Nakamura’s critique of “identity tour-
ism” (2014: 45)—I still like to think that tactics of defamiliarization offer critical 
resources for occupying a digital milieu whose demands for “real” identifica-
tion serve neoliberal capital and the surveillance state. Like social media terms 
of service that demand authenticity, the terms regulating intellectual property 
(IP)—which apply both to the user’s own content and to third-party IP appro-
priated by the user—illustrate the tension between social media strategies of 
interpellation and user tactics of defamiliarization. Against these demands and 
terms, several feminist intellectuals, artists, and activists lead appropriations of 
both “realness” (Smith and Watson, 76) and IP, different practices of dubjection 
that may point to “new ways to conceive of identity itself” (Poletti and Rak, 2014: 
17). Exemplary cases of social media use that critique and subvert hegemonic 
subject formations of the neoliberal digital sphere—through intertextual appro-
priations—include the extensive YouTube work of Anita Sarkeesian to critique 
gender tropes in digital culture, and the self-proclaimed “pop culture piracy” of 
Elisa Kreisinger, whose remix work teaches and models fair use.
To take up the IP angle, and return to the example of Twitter, some “viral” 
Twitter accounts like @FeministHulk, @FeministTSwift, and @BrideOnAcid 
illustrate possibilities for critical digital détournement. One commonality 
among all three is how they exploit Twitter’s affordances for self-identification, 
which are much more free-form than Facebook’s presentation of profiles fixed 
to coordinates of age, gender, relationship, and location. Another commonal-
ity is how they deploy pseudonyms and distinctively styled voices to construct 
uncanny identities, at once immediately recognizable yet profoundly strange. 
FeministHulk and FeministTSwift both appropriate the “realness” of celeb-
rity brand names. FeministHulk gender-bends a highly profitable and hyper-
masculinist comic book character, and adopts a textual style—all caps and 
broken English—that both mimics the original character’s speech and puts 
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refreshingly progressive words in his mouth: “HULK UNWIND FROM LONG 
DAY OF SMASH. SIP TEA, WATCH OLD FEMINIST FREQUENCY VIDEOS, 
MAYBE MAKE CURRY WITH CSA SHARE. AH! BIG GREEN SELF-CARE.” 
FeministHulk has also propagated its own genre of Twitter parody accounts; 
FeministTSwift arguably counts among the FeministHulk’s belligerent and 
numerous progeny, taking not the Hulk label but the feminist flag to construct 
the user as a fan of Taylor Swift who then reconstructs herself as a feminist ver-
sion of Taylor Swift: “Happy. Free. Confused. Oppressed by the patriarchy. At 
the same time.” FeministTSwift’s updates are almost entirely composed of lines 
from Taylor Swift songs, rewritten with feminist theory: “I don’t know about 
you / But I’m feeling 22 / cents underpaid on the dollar.”
Given the relentless lobbying and punitive litigation corporate copyright hold-
ers pursue in order to protect their content monopolies, not to mention the licens-
ing fees they charge for song lyrics, FeministTSwift’s extensive use of Taylor Swift 
lyrics seems especially bold—it may constitute fair use, but user rights haven’t 
stopped copyright holders from pressuring users to pay for their use, or alleging 
trademark infringement; the same goes for FeministHulk’s use of Marvel’s lucra-
tive comic book character (see Tushnet 2007 on fair use and gender critique).
BrideOnAcid, though, works differently, more in the style of what’s been 
called “Weird Twitter” (Schmidt, 2013). This account’s particular genius is to con-
dense a narrative plot into the user name itself, implying that the feed represents 
a bride who has dropped acid on her wedding day. The feed is a very funny, fem-
inist satire on weddings as a billion-dollar business and a heteronormative insti-
tution. “got my teeth whitened for the big day. kind of a waste since they all just 
crumbled away.” The premise of drug use provides a familiar device of alienation 
effects that makes everything about a wedding day powerfully strange—well, 
stranger than a wedding day already is. (Consider the unpredictable quality of 
conversations in your own activity feed by all the users you know from different 
circles. Ever feel like moderating comments in your feed is like moderating an 
open mic at a wedding reception?) BrideOnAcid appears no longer to be regu-
larly updated, but this account’s now-archival character does not disqualify it 
from consideration as an exemplary dubject. As Cover says, the archiving affor-
dances of social media let users’ constructions of identity continue to signify in 
their absence or even death, and maybe even sustain subjectivity more robustly 
than offline performances. An all-too-familiar example of this, in Facebook, is 
the automated invitation to “friend” a user whom you know to be deceased. 
How is it that the recording can dictate?
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It is important to note that, for all the Verfremdungseffekte such critical and 
appropriative Twitter dubjects achieve at the level of content, their mode of 
production in occupying a corporate platform like Twitter ultimately provides 
free labour to feed the firm’s appetite for analytics, and thus bolsters its bottom 
line, just as well as noncritical content does. However critical the front-end con-
tent, the back-end analytics can only create a metadata dubject that is a fully 
compliant and unprotesting puppet of neoliberal capital. This contradiction 
between critical user-generated content and unconscious metadata production 
illustrates capitalism’s resilient and robust ability to capitalize on critical resist-
ance to its own forms and norms. That said, to acknowledge that the effective-
ness of resisting the dominant interpellations of social media is more symbolic 
than material is not to discount the significance of the symbolic as such. Such 
defamiliarizing demonstrations as the aforementioned Twitter users model, 
for sizeable Internet audiences, how these platforms’ interpellations may be 
answered not straightforwardly but against the grain, not in the affirmative but 
in the interrogative. Such demonstrations critique the ideological foundations 
and presumptions of Internet user identity.
More than just an imposition on privacy, the corporate demand for users’ 
“real” identities curtails freedom of expression, and reinforces a pernicious ideol-
ogy of authenticity, of “common sense,” of “bottom-line” realism that forms an 
ideological kernel of both white mythology and neo-imperialist capital. In social 
media’s interpellations, philosopher Tobias van Veen reads “the cryptofascism 
of corporate perception”—orders of discourse structured and limited by corpor-
ate social media: “the technics of perception in which uncitizens engage with 
the social network aligns desire with socially networked consumerism. Desire is 
directed toward a ceaseless flow of objects and data (either LIKED or absented 
in response)” (2011). Van Veen’s point is that social networks erase the nation-
state and thus cripple democratic participation in it: since, in social networks, 
the nation-state “does not exist as such—which is to say as a metric of consumer 
desire,” then its virtual nonexistence enables its material dismantling by neo-
imperial capital.
According to a postcolonial view of the persistence and transformation of his-
torical empires in neo-imperial global capital, a more extensive inquiry into sub-
ject theory, a close reading of discourses on dubjection, and a cursory reading of 
how Internet services interpellate their users, a fuller image of the dubject devel-
ops: not just colonized but colonizer, embodying and enacting the contradictions 
and complicities of remediated everyday life under imperialist white supremacist 
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capitalist patriarchy. As a model of remediated and redistributed subjectivity, the 
dubject already occupies an uncanny dimension between authenticity and simu-
lation, autonomy and automation, presence and haunting, public and private, 
user and commodity, colonizer and colonized. The theory of the dubject already 
posits a defamiliarization of the subject, its transmutation from corporeal per-
formativity to the different embodiments of digital representations and occupa-
tions. Amid the demands for “real” user identification, and despite the encodings 
of neoliberal ideology in the affordances that interpellate the users who are also 
their products, Internet users remain capable of producing profound alienation 
effects—defamiliarizations of digital identity which remind us that subjectivity, 
as we knew it, was always a fiction anyway. Max Headroom lives: news reporters 
outsource the writing of articles to code robots, but keep their authorial bylines 
(Dingwall and Mattar, 2013). Facebook suggests people you may know, some of 
whom are deceased but maintain profiles (Walker, 2011). Data miners assemble 
and trade the latent doppelgängers of Internet users’ manifest doppelgängers for 
profit, for favours, for blackmail, for tax breaks. A stellar wind needles the groove 
of The Well-Tempered Clavier, stirring Gould’s fingers. The machine doesn’t stop; 
it is steered by the dead and living hands of the privileged and the entitled; it is fed 
by the ghosts of the dead and the living.
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NOTES
1 In my 2012 chapter, I wrote that Voyager 2 left the solar system in 1989, but that 
claim is imprecise: while Voyager 2 is now twice as far from the sun as Pluto, it 
has yet to exit the heliosphere, the outermost “bubble” of the solar system where 
the sun’s solar wind balances against the stellar winds of other stars (NASA 2012).
2 The augmented reality argument is also an interesting case of open review, more 
than peer review: the idea was no sooner blogged about than it caught on by dint 
of distribution power, given its authors skilled exploitation of both social and 
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major print media; what it needs—and what, to its credit, its proponents openly 
invite—is more rigorous peer review and debate.
3 As an alternative to Prensky’s framework, David White and Alison Le Cornu 
(2011) have proposed a typology of “visitors” and “residents” that both dispenses 
with the racist and imperialist assumptions of “natives” and “immigrants” and 
also allows for a continuum of movement between these positions.
4 Not a postcolonialist scholar, de Kerckhove refers to analyses of media 
imperialism in the quotation I’ve used as an epigraph: while his claim that 
“the colonizers are always the first victims of the colonizing technology” is an 
egregious misrepresentation of colonialism to say the least, it can also be read, 
more generously, in the spirit of Freire (1970/2000), for whom the dialectic of 
oppressor and oppressed dehumanizes both, but vests agency in the latter to 
educate and so liberate both oppressed and oppressor alike (1970/2000, 54).
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